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ABSTRACT: Health insurance exchanges are the centerpiece of the private health insurance 
reforms of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA). If they function as 
planned, these exchanges will expand health insurance coverage, improve the quality of such 
coverage and perhaps of health care itself, and reduce costs. Previous attempts at creating health 
insurance exchanges, however, produced only mixed results. This report identifies the earlier 
attempts’ problems, enumerates the key issues that are critical for overcoming those problems, 
analyzes in detail the ACA’s provisions addressing these issues, and discusses further  
policy options. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Health insurance exchanges are the centerpiece of the private health insurance 
reforms of the Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA). If they function as planned, these 
exchanges will expand health insurance coverage, improve the quality of such coverage 
and perhaps of health care itself, and reduce costs. Previous attempts at creating health 
insurance exchanges, however, enjoyed only mixed results. As part of successfully 
implementing the new exchanges, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) and the states must address issues that undermined the earlier attempts. These 
issues are: 
 
• Adverse selection. It is absolutely necessary that exchanges be protected against 
adverse selection (the disproportionate purchase of health insurance by the least 
healthy individuals)—especially because, under the ACA, small-group and 
nongroup insurance options remain available outside the exchanges. However, a 
number of provisions of the ACA level the playing field inside and outside the 
exchange, and weaken incentives for adverse selection. These protections can also 
be enhanced by the states. 
• Numbers of participants. Exchanges that include large numbers of enrollees, as 
well as a high percentage of the total number of enrollees who are participating in 
the entire insurance market, offer greater market power, economies of scale, more 
stable risk pools, and stronger protection against adverse selection. The ACA 
offers opportunities for expanding risk pools, which should be fully exploited. 
• Market coverage and structure. The ACA permits both the combination and 
separation of small-group and nongroup risk pools and exchanges. It also allows 
the creation of regional or subsidiary exchanges. The advantages and 
disadvantages of pursuing these options must be carefully weighed. 
• Choice without complexity. The exchange model created by the ACA presents 
consumers with structured choices. An important implementation decision will be 
whether to further structure choices or, alternatively, to offer maximum choice 
and flexibility within the constraints of the ACA. 
• Transparency and disclosure. The ACA contains numerous provisions designed 
to maximize transparency and disclosure. Putting these requirements into 
operation will be one of the Act’s most important implementation tasks. 
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• Competition. The exchanges are intended to increase competition among insurers 
and focus that competition on value and price. A number of provisions of the 
ACA should help to facilitate this objective.  
• Administrative costs. The ACA requires exchanges to fulfill a number of 
administrative functions that will add to their costs. Exchanges must find ways to 
reduce such internal costs, as well as the administrative costs to insurers and 
employers, if they are to offer better value to enrollees. 
• Market or regulator? The ACA delegates to exchanges a number of regulatory 
responsibilities. Exchanges must certify health plans for participation and can 
exercise regulatory authority through this power. An important implementation 
choice will be whether exchanges should, on the one hand, maximize plan 
participation by minimizing certification requirements or, on the other hand, use 
their certification authority to limit exchange participation to high-value plans. 
• Administering subsidies and mandates. The exchanges will play important roles 
in establishing insurance affordability, administering cost-sharing subsidies, and 
serving as a gateway to other public programs. It is particularly important that 
exchanges coordinate seamlessly with other public programs because participants 
will often move back and forth between an exchange, Medicaid, and the 
Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). 
• State, regional, or national exchanges? Although the ACA favors the creation of 
state exchanges, it also confers authority to create a federal exchange as well as a 
multistate insurance program, and it provides for the possibility of regional 
exchanges. Important policy choices will need to be made concerning which 
avenues particular states should pursue and how the federal government should 
react to state action—or inaction. 
• Governance. The ACA provides very little guidance as to how exchanges should 
be governed. HHS and the states must carefully consider how the entities that 
govern exchanges should be structured and how they relate to other state and to 
federal institutions. 
• Relationships with employers. Although exchanges must be employer-friendly if 
they are to succeed, the ACA offers little guidance in this regard. Such 
relationships nevertheless need to be a major focus of implementation efforts. 
• Cost control. Exchanges have been sold as a mechanism for moderating the 
growth of health insurance costs. Achieving this objective will only be possible if 
exchanges are implemented so as to maximize competition, choice, and 
participation and to minimize administrative cost and adverse selection. 
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HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: 
KEY POLICY ISSUES 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Health insurance exchanges are the centerpiece of the private health insurance reforms of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA). It is expected that once 
state-level exchanges become fully operational in 2014 they will play a major role in the 
purchase and sale of health insurance (Exhibit 1). They will supervise insurance-plan 
marketing and competition in the small-group and nongroup markets; oversee the 
standardization of plan benefits and cost-sharing; bear some responsibility for restraining 
premium growth; and administer the distribution of tax credits for lower- and middle-
income people who lack access to employer-sponsored coverage and who earn too much 
to be eligible for Medicaid. If the exchanges function as planned, they will expand 
coverage, improve the quality of health insurance coverage—perhaps even of health care 
itself—and reduce costs. 
 
 
 
Over the next four years, federal and state implementation of the ACA will be 
centered on getting the health insurance exchanges up and running. It will be very 
important that the exchange implementation process be sound, and that we learn from 
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earlier mistakes and build on existing successes. Congress has from time to time 
implemented an innovation that one or more states have tried successfully—Medicare 
diagnostic-related groups payment is one such example. But while a few state-level 
exchanges have been quite successful, many others have failed. Thus, Congress has built 
its reform of private health insurance markets largely on what has to date been an 
experiment with decidedly mixed results.  
 
The health insurance exchange is not a new idea. It is grounded in the concept of 
managed competition developed by economist Alain Enthoven and others in the late 
1980s.1 Exchanges have been around for nearly two decades in various guises—as 
purchasing cooperatives, health alliances, and connectors—among states and private 
entities. Health alliances also were at the center of the failed Clinton Health Security Act 
in the early 1990s.2 The best of the exchange-like programs—including the Federal 
Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), the California Public Employees 
Retirement System, the Dane County (Wisconsin) Public Employees Program, the 
Massachusetts Connector, and Connecticut Business and Industry Association’s Health 
Connections exchange—have enjoyed success in increasing choice of plans and 
moderating cost growth. Many efforts at creating exchanges, however—including 
exchanges in California, Texas, Florida, Colorado, North Carolina, and elsewhere—have 
failed, sometimes after enjoying some initial success.3  
 
The theory behind exchanges appears to be sound. The large employer group 
health insurance market is generally viewed as successful because large groups can create 
sizeable and stable risk pools, minimize adverse selection (by covering all employees 
who do not opt out), deal with insurers from a position of bargaining strength or insure 
themselves, and keep administrative costs low. Also, large employers can offer their 
employees a choice of benefit plans, enabling them to pick the plan that best matches 
their needs and resources. An exchange, in theory at least, could offer these advantages to 
the small employer group and nongroup market, thereby stabilizing these markets, 
lowering transaction costs, increasing competition, and widening choice. For exchanges 
to succeed, however, they will have to avoid the pitfalls of earlier efforts that failed. The 
ACA goes to some length toward achieving this goal, though more will have to be done 
as implementation proceeds.  
 
The burden of creating successful exchanges will first fall to the federal 
government. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—in addition to 
drafting regulations and issuing guidance (in consultation with the National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners and other stakeholders) that help operationalize the 
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exchange concept—has the responsibility under the ACA to administer the subsidies 
granted to the states to help them begin exchange implementation, monitor that 
implementation, and establish a federal exchange alternative for states that elect not to 
implement their own exchanges or that fail to effectively do so. In the end, however, the 
ACA leaves the task of implementing the exchanges to the states, which will have the 
responsibility of actually making them work. 
 
This report, the first of a series on health insurance exchanges, examines 13 issues 
that must be resolved for the exchanges to succeed. In each of the subsections that follow 
we first describe the issue and then analyze in some detail how the ACA addresses it.  
 
KEY ISSUES THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXCHANGES MUST ADDRESS 
Adverse Selection 
The Issue 
The single most important reason why some exchanges have not succeeded in the past is 
that they became the victims of adverse selection—they were unable to capture a large 
enough share of the healthy participants in the insurance market.4 In effect, these 
exchanges attempted to offer better coverage, or more affordable coverage, to too many 
individuals or groups with unfavorable risk profiles and were unable to attract enough 
healthy enrollees.5  
 
Indeed, as long as small-group or nongroup coverage is easily available outside 
the exchange, the potential exists for healthy individuals and groups to find policies 
cheaper than those available through the exchange. A particular concern is the possibility 
that employer-sponsored groups can “self-insure” (thus escaping state regulation) as long 
as their employees are healthy, only to turn to the exchange once group members’ health 
deteriorates.  
 
In this way, an exchange can essentially turn into a high-risk pool, with its 
coverage becoming unaffordable and its enrollees becoming very unattractive to insurers. 
The most successful exchanges have featured a large and diverse population (such as 
FEHBP), have barred outside competition, or have made available significant advantages 
only to individuals participating in the exchange (for example, in Massachusetts, 
premium subsidies are available only through the state’s Health Connector).6  
 
The ACA 
The ACA does not eliminate the potential for adverse selection, as it permits both an 
individual and group health insurance market to continue to exist outside the exchange.7 
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People cannot be restricted to insurance plans offered within the exchange. Lower-risk 
individuals in particular can go outside the exchange, without penalty, if they find less 
expensive coverage there.8 The ACA also provides for “grandfathered” plans to exist 
outside the exchange.9  
 
Many of the provisions of the ACA will, however, tend to discourage adverse 
selection against the exchange. First, the Internal Revenue Code, as amended by the 
ACA, requires individuals to have “minimum essential coverage.”10 Individuals who do 
not have employer-based or public insurance will be required to purchase an insurance 
plan or pay a penalty. By encouraging individuals to at least purchase insurance 
somewhere, healthy individuals will be dissuaded from staying out of the insurance 
market altogether.  
 
Second, most of the insurance reforms imposed by the ACA apply both within 
and outside the exchange. These provisions, which might encourage adverse selection if 
they applied only within the exchange, include: 
 
• Banning lifetime or annual dollar limits on coverage;11 
• Requiring plans to permit members’ participation in approved clinical trials 
(relative to the prevention, detection, or treatment of cancer or other life- 
threatening diseases) and to cover the routine patient costs of such participation;12 
• Permitting premium variation based only on age (3:1), geographic region, 
individual or family coverage, or tobacco use (1.5:1); and prohibiting rating based 
on health status;13 
• Guaranteeing the issuing and renewability of coverage;14 
• Prohibiting preexisting-condition exclusions;15 and 
• Prohibiting waiting periods of longer than 90 days.16 
 
Third, individual and small-group plans, both within and outside the exchange, 
must cover defined “essential health benefits” (Exhibit 2),17 with a scope equal to that of 
the typical employer plan.18 State benefit requirements also continue to apply outside as 
well as inside the exchange.19 Beginning in 2014, out-of-pocket expenditures both inside 
and outside cannot exceed those allowed for high-deductible health plans linked to health 
savings accounts.20 Deductibles in the small-group market cannot exceed $2,000 for 
individuals and $4,000 for families. Plans outside the exchange will be limited, therefore, 
in their ability to attract healthy individuals by offering higher cost-sharing or by 
excluding benefits that might be more attractive to high-cost individuals. Direct 
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marketing of insurance plans through the exchange, to the extent it occurs, also will 
reduce the ability of agents and brokers to engage in “street underwriting”—that is, to 
informally steer low-risk enrollees away from the exchange, and high-risk enrollees into 
the exchange, through marketing practices.21 
 
 
 
Fourth, aside from their dealings with enrollees in grandfathered plans, health 
insurance issuers must treat all individual enrollees in their plans as a single pool and all 
enrollees in the small-group market as another single pool; or, if the state elects, treat 
members of both pools as one single pool.22 Issuers of qualified health plans must agree 
to charge the same premium rate for a qualified health plan whether it is inside and 
outside the exchange.23 
 
Fifth, the ACA includes three risk-adjustment programs—two transitional and one 
permanent—that should reduce adverse selection against the exchange.24 If plans outside 
the exchange attract a significantly healthier population than plans within the exchange, 
the former group will need to compensate the latter. The first risk-adjustment program, a 
permanent one to be administered by the states,25 covers health plans inside and outside 
the exchange, but not self-insured or grandfathered plans. In this program the state will 
assess plans and insurers with low-risk enrollees and make payments to plans and 
insurers with high-risk enrollees. Second, the bill includes a transitional reinsurance 
program to be implemented for 36 months (from 2014 to 2016) by the states under 
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contracts with private reinsurers.26 Finally, during the 2014–2016 period a risk-corridor 
program also would be available for qualified health plans in the individual and small-
group market.27  
 
The transitional reinsurance program is likely to prove very important for 
smoothing the introduction of the exchanges, which are likely to pick up most of the 
participants in the federal high-risk pool when it terminates at the end of 2014.28 States 
may terminate their own high-risk pool programs, and companies may terminate or cut 
back on early-retirement coverage, as the exchanges become available. Because 
individual mandate penalties do not fully phase in until 2017, unhealthy individuals may 
be overrepresented in the exchanges for the first few years.29 The reinsurance program 
will help to ease this transition. The permanent risk-adjustment program also will be 
essential, as it should deter risk selection against the exchange on a long-term basis. 
 
Perhaps the most important protection that the exchanges will have from adverse 
selection, however, is that the ACA’s premium-assistance credits and cost-sharing 
reduction payments will be accessible only to individuals enrolled in health plans through 
exchanges.30 These subsidies, for households with incomes of up to 400 percent of the 
poverty level, are expected to cover 19 million Americans (Exhibit 3).31 The subsidies 
become available once a family has spent a percentage of its income on health insurance 
premiums. For example, a qualifying family would only receive assistance once it had 
spent 9.5 percent of its household income. At this level, a young healthy family might 
find it less expensive to purchase the minimum essential coverage outside the exchange, 
as opposed to purchasing a subsidized plan within the exchange. At lower income levels, 
however, the subsidies are much more substantial. It is likely that most persons eligible 
for subsidies will remain within the exchange. 
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Tax credits also will be available to small employers through the exchange, 
though only for the first two years that an employer offers insurance through the 
exchange.32 This provision, it is hoped, will encourage employers to purchase health 
insurance for their employees through the exchange. Finally, the ACA requires states that 
mandate the coverage of certain benefits (which are not part of the federal essential 
benefits package) to cover the cost of those added benefits only if they are provided by 
qualified health plans. This also should encourage the purchase of qualified plans through 
the exchange.33 
 
The provisions of the ACA, however, do not eliminate the possibility of adverse 
selection against the exchange. In the first place, only “qualified health plans” can be sold 
within the exchange. These qualified health plans must comply with all of the 
requirements in the ACA that apply to health plans generally, including covering 
essential benefits, but the exchange’s plans also must comply with additional 
requirements that might render them more expensive than plans outside the exchange. 
This, in turn, could make the non-exchange plans more attractive to healthier 
individuals,34 and also could make the marketing of plans through the exchange less 
attractive to insurers, thereby contributing to adverse selection. 
 
Health insurers may market qualified health plans both inside and outside the 
exchange, and they must sell gold- and silver-level coverage through the exchange before 
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they can sell other levels of coverage there. Insurers, however, do not need to participate 
in the exchange if they choose not to. They can remain outside the exchange, selling 
bronze-level high-cost-sharing plans to healthy enrollees or catastrophic plans to people 
under 30 or to persons who cannot find affordable policies.35 This leaves open the 
possibility for healthy individuals or small employers to purchase minimum coverage 
outside the exchange, thereby threatening significant adverse selection against it. Self-
insured plans are subject to even less rigorous requirements under the ACA, and they 
might offer coverage that is substantially less protective, and less costly, than exchange 
coverage.36 Some adverse selection against the exchange, therefore, is likely. 
 
Although the ACA does not allow the federal government to require individuals 
or employees to purchase insurance through the exchange, it doesn’t preclude the states 
from imposing additional requirements to discourage adverse selection. The ACA only 
preempts state laws that would “prevent the application” of the ACA, and state laws 
limiting or tightly regulating the sale of insurance outside the exchange would not violate 
this principle.37 The only federal constraint on state regulation of the health insurance 
market is that they cannot, because of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA), regulate self-insured plans.  
 
States could, for example, adopt laws that: prohibit insurers from selling 
insurance outside the exchange; require insurers that sell insurance outside the exchange 
to sell only qualified health plans; or require insurers that sell insurance outside the 
exchange to comply with all of the requirements applicable to plans sold inside the 
exchange.38 But states may want to: prohibit insurers that participate in the exchange 
from establishing separate affiliates to sell only outside the exchange; prohibit insurers 
from selling only bronze or catastrophic coverage outside the exchange; or prohibit 
insurers from using marketing practices or benefit structures intended to attract healthy 
applicants to plans outside the exchange while discouraging unhealthy applicants. 
Insurance regulators can monitor grandfathered plans carefully to make sure that they are 
not “lemon dropping”—that is, encouraging high-cost enrollees to move to the exchange. 
States that have entered into an interstate compact could require plans (as permitted under 
the ACA, section 1333) to sell interstate policies only through the exchange.39 States also 
could prohibit brokers from collecting higher commissions for plans sold outside the 
exchange, thereby discouraging them from steering business elsewhere.40  
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Numbers of Participants 
The Issue 
Earlier exchanges were troubled by their inability to attain a large enough pool of 
participants. This was problematic for several reasons. First, if an exchange can offer 
only a small number of enrollees, it is unlikely to attract enough health insurance plans. 
Moreover, the insurers it does attract are unlikely to give the exchange a better deal, or 
perhaps even as good a deal, as what they offer directly. Insurers already active in a 
particular market generally prefer to sell a single plan to a group, thereby capturing all of 
its enrollees, rather than to compete with other insurers for individual enrollees. And 
insurers not already selling their products in that market are unlikely to enter it without 
being offered the possibility of an attractive customer base. Either way, the exchange has 
to offer insurers a pool sufficiently large that it cannot be ignored.41  
 
Second, an exchange must achieve a significant size to be able to create 
economies of scale and limit administrative costs. Any exchange will have certain fixed 
expenses, such as personnel, IT, publication, legal, rent, and utilities. Spreading these 
expenses over a larger population will reduce the costs imposed on each participant.42  
 
Third, insurers are unlikely to market through an exchange unless they can be 
assured of enough enrollees to offer a credible insurance-risk pool. Small insurance 
pools, being potentially volatile and susceptible to destabilization by large claims, are 
problematic for insurers. According to one expert view, a risk pool of at least 100,000 
covered lives would probably be necessary to be viable.43 An exchange should have a 
large enough enrollee base to offer several competing insurers credible risk pools. If 
insurers cover a number of lives outside of the exchange, however, the size of the pool 
offered by the exchange may be less important. Moreover, once risk-status underwriting 
is eliminated, a universal insurance-purchase mandate goes into effect, and reinsurance 
and risk adjustment are implemented, the risk faced by a single plan will be considerably 
diminished, at which point credibility will be less of an issue.  
 
Finally, an exchange must be able to offer a large enough group of enrollees to 
permit insurers to obtain favorable discounts from providers.44 Virtually all health 
insurance plans today are network plans, and providers do not give an insurer discounts 
unless they believe that the insurer can deliver a significant share of an insurance market. 
An insurer might currently be able to obtain provider discounts in a new market by 
signing a major employer in the area, but in an exchange the insurer will have to attract 
enrollees on an individual basis. In the case of exchanges, size does matter. 
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It is important to note that the percentage of a market captured by an exchange is 
at least as critical as the absolute number of enrollees—at least, above some minimal 
number. An exchange that contains 20 percent to 25 percent of the privately insured 
participants in a small state is less vulnerable to adverse selection and likely to possess 
more market clout than an exchange with more enrollees but a smaller market share in  
a larger state.45 This is another reason for maximizing participation by employers in  
the exchange.  
 
The ACA 
As noted earlier, the ACA’s subsidy and mandate provisions should encourage large 
numbers of individuals to purchase insurance through the exchanges. The small-employer 
tax credit also will create an incentive for very small employers to purchase insurance for 
their employees through the exchange, although the credit is only available for two years 
after the exchanges go on line.46 
 
By contrast, large employers (employing more than 100 people) are initially not 
allowed to purchase insurance for their employees through the exchange; and until 2016, 
states can restrict exchange participation to employers with 50 or fewer employees.47 
Beginning in 2017, however, states may open their exchanges to employment groups in 
excess of 100 employees.48  
 
As large employer-sponsored groups currently cover 133 million people while 
small groups covers only 43 million and the nongroup market insures only 17 million, 
opening up the exchanges to larger groups as soon as possible may be vital to their 
ultimate success.49 On the other hand, the pursuit of larger employers will have to be 
done with care, lest only employers with less-healthy-than-average employees enter the 
exchanges while employers with healthier enrollees remain self-insured or experience-
rated. States also should consider providing state and local government employee 
coverage through the exchanges, as this could dramatically expand the size of the 
participant pool.50 Even prior to 2017, states could establish state and local government 
exchanges that parallel the ACA exchanges and contract with the same insurers. This 
would immediately increase market share, and after 2017 the two types of exchanges 
could be merged.51 
 
Market Coverage and Structure 
The Issue 
Should there be separate risk pools for individuals and small firms or only one risk pool 
for both? On the one hand, a single risk pool would be larger and less volatile. On the 
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other, the risk profiles of group and nongroup pools have heretofore been quite different 
in many states, and a risk pool combining both could contribute to market instability or 
regulatory complexity.52  
 
Whether or not a state should maintain separate individual and small-group 
exchanges is a related question. A separate SHOP (Small Business Health Options 
Program) exchange could focus on servicing the needs of small businesses, for example, 
offering consolidated billing for employee premiums. But a combined exchange could 
potentially offer enrollees more choices if insurers were required to participate in  
both markets.  
 
Another related issue is the geographic coverage area of the exchange. If a small 
state offers too small a participant pool to be viable, a regional exchange involving 
several states may be indicated. Conversely, some states may be so large that a single 
exchange would be unwieldy. Plan pricing also may need to vary within an exchange so 
as to take account of variations in the price of health care within different parts of a state 
or region. In most states, it will make sense to allow HMOs to participate in exchanges 
that cover only local or regional areas rather than the entire exchange, as this allows for 
the maximization of enrollee choices and competition.53 Care may need to be taken, 
however, to avoid the redlining of areas with lower-income enrollees or racial minorities. 
Finally, special issues may arise where metropolitan areas span two or more states, or 
where an individual may live in one state and be employed in another.54 
 
The ACA 
The ACA requires insurers to pool all of their individual members in one risk pool and all 
of their small-employer group members in another, but the law also gives states the 
prerogative to combine risk pools.55 Whether or not a state chooses to do so will depend 
on the factors discussed above. The ACA also allows states to operate separate individual 
and small-business exchanges, or to merge the two into a single exchange.56 Although 
there may be sound reasons for maintaining a separate small-business (SHOP) exchange 
(see below), combining the exchanges may be necessary, at least in smaller states, to 
create a large enough market to attract insurers and to reduce the administrative-cost load. 
The ACA also offers the possibility of subsidiary exchanges within a state, and of 
regional exchanges, which are discussed further below.57 In sum, the ACA offers a menu 
of options by which states may address their particular needs, though the making of 
sound choices will require considerable thought.  
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Choice Without Complexity 
The Issue 
One of the major selling points of exchanges is that they have the potential to widen the 
choice of health plans.58 Surveys consistently show that a wider choice of plans results in 
greater enrollee satisfaction.59 In fact, whatever else can be said about the exchange 
experience to date, exchanges do have a good track record of increasing the choices 
available to individual enrollees, particularly in the small-group market. Choices can be 
offered among different insurers, premium levels, benefit packages, cost-sharing options, 
and provider networks. Insurers also can offer innovative approaches to plan design or 
service provision, such as accountable-care organizations, medical homes, or value-based 
cost-sharing. 
 
Too much or the wrong kind of choice can be counterproductive, however, by 
making insurance shopping more complex.60 Choice is optimized if it focuses the 
enrollee’s attention on the salient features of the health plans. By contrast, when choice is 
unstructured it can become overwhelming, resulting in choices that are largely random 
and may not serve the individual’s actual interests. Because exchanges offer the 
possibility of standardizing plan choices,61 they can concentrate selection on key features 
such as price or cost-sharing requirements. They also can eliminate “fine print” 
exclusions or exceptions that are usually ignored in the selection process but that can 
have a devastating effect when a rare and unanticipated condition occurs. Above all, 
exchanges can offer convenient, fast, and responsive service to consumers, which 
improves their experience in purchasing and dealing with insurers rather than frustrating 
or alienating them. 
 
The ACA 
If the premium subsidies described above create a large enough market so that insurers 
find operating through exchanges to be an attractive proposition, despite the additional 
requirements involved, exchanges will be able to offer a range of health plan options to 
their enrollees. 
 
The ACA distinguishes among four levels of coverage based on “actuarial value” 
(the average percent of medical costs covered by a health plan), with an additional 
catastrophic policy (Exhibit 2).62 The bronze-level plan has to provide benefits equivalent 
to 60 percent of the actuarial value, with the silver level at 70 percent, the gold level at 80 
percent, and the platinum level at 90 percent.63 Catastrophic policies are available only 
for persons under age 30 or those who cannot otherwise find affordable coverage or 
would suffer a hardship in buying other coverage.64 Qualified health plans must agree to 
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offer at least one plan at the silver level and at least one at the gold.65 Nothing in the law 
prohibits states from requiring plans within (or outside) the exchange from standardizing 
plans even more—for example, by offering only a limited number of deductible options 
or requiring copayments instead of coinsurance. Indeed, a state could establish a standard 
plan at each tier to give consumers a benchmark for analysis.66 Greater standardization 
might not only aid consumer choice but also deter the structuring of benefit and cost-
sharing packages for risk-selection purposes.67 
 
Individuals may choose any qualified health plan offered through the exchange,68 
with premium-affordability credits keyed to the cost of the second-lowest-cost silver 
plan. Nothing in the legislation prohibits a subsidized individual from choosing a more 
generous plan (other than a catastrophic plan) and paying the difference in cost, or from 
choosing a less generous plan and paying less.69 However, the cost-sharing reduction 
subsidies are available only to a person who chooses a silver-tier plan, as the subsidies 
are intended to raise the actuarial value of a silver-level plan to a higher level (Exhibit 
4).70 Therefore, it is expected that most subsidized enrollees will choose silver-level 
plans. If an employer contributes to insurance purchased through the exchange, the 
employee may enroll in any qualified health plan in the tier of coverage chosen by his or 
her employer.71 In this way, the ACA will expand but also channel choices. 
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Transparency and Disclosure 
The Issue 
Choice is meaningful only if it is informed. One of the potential benefits of exchanges is 
that they can require participating health plans to fully disclose their terms and 
conditions, in a comparable form and in plain language, so that enrollees can actually 
understand what alternatives are available.72 In this way, they may form realistic 
expectations regarding their coverage. Exchanges also can facilitate communication with 
linguistic or cultural minorities. And exchanges can and should offer reliable and 
objective ratings of the quality and efficiency of available plans. 
 
The ACA 
The ACA contains a host of transparency and disclosure requirements that should 
significantly expand the amount of information available to health insurance consumers. 
Section 1001 (which creates §2715 of the Public Health Services Act) requires the HHS 
secretary, in consultation with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and 
others, to develop standards which group health plans (including self-insured plans and 
grandfathered plans) and health insurance issuers (both inside and outside the exchange) 
must follow in providing summaries of benefits and coverage explanations.73 Each plan 
must provide its summary of benefits and coverage explanation to enrollees, who are 
entitled to 60 days notice of modification of plan terms, as well as to applicants. These 
requirements preempt any state standards that require less disclosure. 
 
The legislation imposes separate disclosure requirements on plans seeking to sell 
their policies through an exchange. These include disclosures of: claims-payment policies 
and practices; financial information; data on enrollment and disenrollment and on claims 
denials and rating practices; information on cost-sharing for out-of-network coverage and 
on enrollees’ rights; and “other information as determined appropriate” by HHS.74 
Because plans sold outside an exchange must provide these disclosures to state insurance 
commissioners and to HHS, which must then release the information to the public), this 
requirement should not be a deterrent to exchange participation.75 Exchange plans are 
further required to provide additional information on cost-sharing with respect to specific 
services from specific providers, if an enrollee requests it. 
 
Additional disclosure provisions elsewhere in the ACA require: 
 
• Health insurance issuers and HHS to post on their Web sites justifications for 
seemingly unreasonable premium increases.76 
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• HHS to establish a Web portal on which comparative information will be posted 
about insurers. This information will include medical loss ratio (the percentage of 
premiums paid out in claims and quality improvement expenses), eligibility, 
availability, premium rates, and cost-sharing, consistent with the standards 
described above.77 
• Group health plans and insurance issuers to report to HHS and to enrollees 
information regarding programs to improve health outcomes, reduce hospital 
readmissions, implement patient safety and error-reduction programs, and 
promote prevention and wellness. Insurers must also report the proportion of their 
total premium revenue spent on clinical services, as well as their non-claim costs 
(excluding taxes and fees). HHS is required to post these reports on a Web site.78 
 
The ACA requires exchanges to rate plans based on quality and price, to make 
this information available to the public in a standardized way so that consumers may 
compare plans,79 and to periodically survey exchange plan-member satisfaction.80 
Exchange-based plans also must provide information on the availability of in- and out-of-
network providers.81 
 
Competition 
The Issue 
Efficient competition occurs when consumers may choose from a range of available plan 
options. But there is considerable evidence that local insurance markets are highly 
concentrated in many parts of the United States—that is, too few choices are available 
there. One hope for the exchanges is that they will lure new entrants into concentrated 
markets, thereby increasing the competitiveness of the local insurance industry. To the 
extent that exchanges make insurance markets more competitive and choices more 
focused on price, value, and quality, they will increase market efficiency and reduce 
costs. They also may make it more possible for local and regional integrated health plans 
to compete with large carriers, as occurred with the Dane County exchange in Wisconsin. 
 
The ACA 
The offer of subsidies to lower- and middle-income Americans and to small employers 
who purchase health insurance through the exchange should attract sizeable numbers of 
insurance purchasers. The individual mandate, and the penalties imposed on businesses 
whose employees receive premium subsidies when their employers fail to provide them 
with adequate insurance coverage, also will drive individuals and employers to the 
exchange. The interaction of subsidies and mandates should create an attractive market 
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for insurers, thereby increasing the number of insurers competing for exchange business. 
Guaranteed issue and renewal requirements, the prohibition against health-status 
underwriting, the requirement that all plans cover essential benefits, the risk-reallocation 
mechanisms found in the legislation, and the classification of plans by tiers should all 
focus competition among plans on price and on value. Disclosure and transparency 
requirements also should assist consumers in identifying plans that actually provide good 
value for the money spent. 
 
The ACA creates several other options intended to expand competition. 
Exchanges may offer interstate plans, as well as plans offered by cooperatives and 
“qualified direct primary care medical home plans.”82 They also may offer multistate 
plans that would be available in every state through the Office of Personnel 
Management.83 It is not clear, however, that these options will in fact expand 
competition.  
 
States can already enter into interstate compacts. They exist only for the sale of 
life insurance and not for health insurance, however.84 States have been reluctant to cede 
any regulatory control and, moreover, are concerned about a race to the bottom in 
regulation. The interstate sale of insurance also creates an opportunity for adverse 
selection, as healthy individuals may sign up for low-cost low-value insurance policies 
from lightly regulated states, leaving behind a higher-cost risk pool in their home state.  
 
Cooperatives are already legal as well, but virtually none have been created in 
recent years because of the difficulties of entering new insurance markets and of forming 
cooperative enterprises. They are unlikely to become widespread under the new law.  
 
Finally, the most likely candidates for multistate plans (the Blue plans) already 
exist in most states and are not likely to compete aggressively against themselves. New 
multistate plans will face barriers that are at least as great as those that new local or 
regional plans face, most notably in establishing brand allegiance and convincing 
providers to join networks and give discounts to a new entrant with a small market share.  
 
Note as well that the ACA does not prohibit states from creating a public plan to 
bring additional competition into a market, as long as the plan otherwise meets the 
requirements necessary to be a qualified health plan. All of the above options, however, 
could encourage competition among plans, which should in turn bring down the cost of 
health insurance and improve its value. At least, that is the theory and hope. 
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Administrative Costs 
The Issue 
Exchanges could perform a host of administrative functions, such as processing 
applications (for coverage and subsidies), billing enrollees, doing financial reconciliation, 
paying commissions, developing and maintaining Web sites, performing marketing and 
outreach, and providing broker and human resources training.85 One of the attractive 
features of exchanges is that they have the potential to cut the administrative costs of 
offering health insurance as they perform these functions and thereby increase the 
proportion of insurance premiums actually spent on health care. Because they can offer 
centralized enrollment, exchanges should be able to cut marketing and enrollment costs. 
Brokerage commissions can amount to 10 percent or more of the cost of individual 
insurance policies in the first year, but they could be sharply reduced by a well-
functioning exchange.86 The elimination of risk-based underwriting should cut the cost of 
issuing policies. And by creating greater transparency, exchanges could make insurers’ 
administrative costs more visible, thus creating pressure to lower them.  
 
Exchanges also can take over some of the administration and maintenance of 
insurance policies currently handled by employers—a possibility that offers savings to 
employers who would otherwise have to handle these functions themselves or contract 
them out. By creating a larger risk pool, exchanges also can reduce the risk premium that 
insurers must charge to cover smaller and more volatile pools. By affording continuity of 
coverage when employees change jobs, exchanges can reduce insurer marketing costs.87 
And exchanges can take over some of the tasks currently carried out by insurers, such as 
collecting premiums, thereby reducing premium costs.  
 
Most exchanges to date have not been able to reduce administrative costs 
significantly, however.88 Indeed, some have increased rather than reduced costs, as they 
have simply added their own administrative costs without reducing the costs of either 
employers or insurers.89 Moreover, it often has proven difficult to realize savings that in 
theory should be available. Attempts to eliminate brokerage commissions, for example, 
have simply led brokers to steer clients away from exchanges.90 If an exchange provides 
only a small share of an insurer’s business, the insurer will maintain, and often duplicate, 
administrative functions rather than cede them to the exchange.91 Unless such 
administrative-cost issues are resolved, exchanges may have a difficult time competing 
with insurers marketing policies outside the exchange. 
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The ACA 
It is not at all clear that the ACA exchanges will significantly reduce administrative costs, 
as they have many responsibilities and will not be inexpensive. The administrative costs 
of the Massachusetts Health Connector run to about 3 percent of insurance premiums, 
and it is unlikely that the ACA exchanges will cost much less.92 Initially, the federal 
government will provide grants to the states to set up the exchanges.93 These will 
terminate as of 2015, by which time the exchanges are supposed to be self-supporting 
through fees imposed on participating insurers.94 Administrative cost savings must be 
sufficient to cover these fees if exchange plans are to cost less overall. 
 
Among their responsibilities, exchanges are required to “facilitate” the enrollment 
of individuals and employees of small businesses in qualified health plans.95 Exchanges 
also are charged with enrolling individuals eligible for Medicaid, the Children's Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP), and other available state or local public programs.96 They are 
supposed to contract with “navigators”—organizations that help to inform the public 
about the availability of qualified health plans and financial assistance, as well as help to 
enroll individuals into qualified plans.97 Exchanges will have a substantial role in 
creating, collecting, managing, and distributing information about participating plans.98 
And exchanges also will have regulatory responsibilities (see below), which will  
require resources. 
 
The exchanges will not eliminate brokerage commissions, a major expense in the 
current insurance market. Under the ACA, agents and brokers may still help individuals 
and small groups to enroll in qualified health plans and to apply for premium tax credits 
and cost-sharing reductions.99 Although the exchanges will provide a great deal of 
comparative information about health plans, insurers will in all likelihood continue to 
advertise their products. The ACA also seems to require that individuals be given the 
option of paying their premiums directly to insurers rather than through the exchange, 
and the law provides that federal premium-assistance credits and cost-sharing reduction 
payments be made directly to insurers.100 Nowhere does the ACA require exchanges 
themselves to enroll individuals or the employees of small employers into health plans. 
Insurers therefore may still bear the cost of enrolling individuals and of collecting and 
accounting for premiums. Exchanges are not precluded from offering these services as 
well, but they may end up duplicating what insurers offer.  
 
Insurers should face reduced underwriting costs as health-status underwriting is 
eliminated. But because they will still be able to underwrite based on age, geographic 
location, and tobacco use, and also may offer premium reductions for enrollees who 
 19 
participate in wellness programs, these costs will not disappear. Also, the disclosure and 
transparency requirements will likely impose increased costs on insurers. Finally, the 
ACA encourages insurers to engage in health care quality-improvement programs, which 
are not costless.101 All in all, insurers will continue to bear considerable administrative 
expenses. 
 
On the other hand, the ACA offers opportunities to reduce administrative costs. 
The fact that exchanges will exist in every state makes it likely that certain types of 
national vendors, offering exchanges services such as Web site design and maintenance, 
enrollment and payment processing, and customer service-call centers, will offer their 
services. Exchanges may be able to reduce administrative costs by purchasing these 
services and even engage in joint purchasing arrangements to further reduce costs.102  
 
The medical loss ratio provisions of the ACA might encourage health plans to use 
the exchanges. Under these provisions, insurers that spend less than 80 percent of their 
premium income on payment for clinical services, or on activities that improve quality of 
care, will be required to rebate the difference to their enrollees. But federal and state 
regulatory fees are excluded from the denominator before the ratio is calculated. If 
exchange fees are considered to be regulatory fees (and they probably should not be), 
they will be subtracted from plan administrative costs (and from premiums), increasing 
the medical loss ratio.103 
 
Market or Regulator? 
The Issue 
The fundamental idea of a health insurance exchange is that it is supposed to create a 
well-functioning and efficient market for insurance products. To achieve this goal, an 
exchange must take on some regulatory functions. Exchanges can require insurers to 
provide standardized disclosure of policy terms, guaranteed issue of policies, uniform 
open-enrollment periods, and minimum essential-benefit packages with cost-sharing in 
standardized tiers. Exchanges also can require insurers to provide data that may then be 
disclosed to consumers. Exchanges can limit participation to insurers that comply with 
exchange requirements. And exchanges can negotiate premiums with insurers or, as a 
condition of being able to sell though the exchange, require them to conform to premium 
limitations or other requirements.104 Indeed, most successful exchanges to date, including 
FEHBP and the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPers) have 
negotiated with insurers, although usually not very aggressively.105 
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The ACA 
The primary role of exchanges under the ACA is to create a market; but, as noted above, 
exchanges also have significant regulatory responsibilities. Exchanges may offer only 
qualified health plans,106 and premium-assistance tax credits can be used only to purchase 
such plans.107 One of the functions of exchanges, therefore, is to certify health plans  
as qualified. 
 
An exchange may certify as qualified only those health plans that meet the 
requirements of the ACA—that is, if the exchange “determines that making available 
such health plan through such Exchange is in the interests of the qualified individuals and 
qualified employers in the State or States in which such Exchange operates.”108 An 
exchange cannot exclude a plan because it is a fee-for-service plan or because it 
“provides treatments necessary to prevent patients’ deaths in circumstances the Exchange 
determines are inappropriate or too costly.”109 An exchange cannot impose premium cost 
controls, but it must require that plans seeking certification submit and post on their Web 
sites information justifying a premium increase prior to implementing it. The exchange 
also must take excessive or unjustified premium increases into account in determining 
whether to make a health plan available through the exchange.110  
 
One of the most important policy choices to be made in implementing exchanges 
is whether to pursue this regulatory role aggressively or minimally. On the one hand, 
exchanges could allow every insurer in the state or region to participate, as long as it 
minimally complied with statutory requirements. On the other hand, exchanges could 
limit participation to a few high-value plans, either by applying restrictive certification 
requirements, using a bidding process, or negotiating with plans. Maximizing 
participation might increase competition and innovation, while asserting regulatory 
authority or using a bidding or negotiation process might increase value and consumer 
protection. Both HHS (in the drafting of regulations) and the states (in implementing the 
exchanges) will need to take positions on this issue.  
 
Finally, it must be noted that the new regulatory responsibilities created by the 
ACA are not all assigned to the exchanges. The new requirements that the statute 
imposes on insurers generally will be enforced by state insurance departments or by 
HHS, if a state declines to enforce them.111 And the state or federal government, 
independent of the exchanges, will run the risk-adjustment and reinsurance programs.112 
The ACA provides funding for state insurance-consumer-assistance offices or 
ombudsman programs. Exchanges do have some regulatory responsibilities under the 
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ACA, but the primary responsibility for regulating health insurance will be located 
elsewhere. 
 
Administering Subsidies and Mandates 
The Issue 
One valuable role that exchanges can play is to administer subsidies that assist lower- and 
middle-income people in purchasing insurance. The Massachusetts Connector has been 
successful in large part because it provides subsidies to individuals lacking access to 
employer-sponsored or public insurance; in that way they can purchase insurance through 
the exchange. Exchanges are ideally situated to administer these subsidies, as eligibility 
can be determined during the enrollment process, and the subsidies can be sent directly to 
the insurance plan chosen by each person. The subsidy determination process is likely to 
work most smoothly if it is joined with the Medicaid and CHIP eligibility-determination 
process (as is done in Massachusetts), particularly because families are likely to move 
frequently between Medicaid, CHIP, and the exchanges as their income rises and falls. 
Ideally, plans that participate in Medicaid and CHIP, as well as in the exchange market, 
should be available, so that enrollees can move among programs without having to 
change plans. Exchanges also could play a role in enforcing mandates to purchase 
insurance, at least by identifying individuals who are in compliance and by assisting 
those not in compliance but who wish to comply. 
 
The ACA 
Under the ACA, applications for premium-assistance credits and cost-sharing reduction 
payments are handled through the exchanges.113 For its part, HHS is responsible for 
establishing a system to assure that if individuals apply to an exchange and are found 
eligible for premium subsidies and cost-sharing reductions, or eligible for the state basic 
health programs established by ACA Section 1331, Medicaid, or CHIP, they will be 
enrolled.114 HHS also is supposed to develop and provide to the states a single 
streamlined form that can be filed online, in person, or by telephone—with the exchange 
or with the state—and that can be used to apply for all state health-subsidy programs.115 
The exchange can contract out program-eligibility determination to the state Medicaid 
agency,116 but basic responsibility for processing premium-subsidy applications is 
assigned to HHS, which will determine eligibility after verifying information with the 
Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Homeland Security.117 Centralizing 
enrollment in subsidies through the exchanges, however, should greatly simplify the 
process of providing subsidies. Similarly, the standardization of cost-sharing will 
facilitate the administering of cost-sharing reduction subsidies. 
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The exchange plays a minor role in the administration of the individual mandate, 
certifying that a person is exempt from the mandate when no affordable qualified health 
plan is available to that individual through the exchange or because he or she meets other 
mandate exemptions.118 The exchange plays no role in the enforcement of the mandate, 
which is handled by the Internal Revenue Service.  
 
State, Regional, or National Exchanges? 
The Issue 
To date, insurance exchanges have been created at the state or local level, with one 
notable federal-level exception—FEHBP. In addition, federal Part C and D Medicare 
programs have exchange-like features. As we have learned with Medicaid, the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and other programs, state 
implementation of federally directed programs is at best awkward and at worst 
ineffectual,119 but a national exchange could have implemented a uniform national 
program to solve a national problem. A national exchange could have potentially created 
larger insurance markets and risk pools. It could have lowered administrative costs by 
achieving economies of scale—for example, reducing the variances in state insurance 
mandates and requirements and simplifying regulatory tasks.120 It also could have solved 
the problem of how to deal with markets that span state boundaries, such as the New 
York metropolitan area, where an individual may work in one state and live in another. 
 
There also are arguments for locating the exchange at the state level. Foremost is 
that for more than a century states have had primary responsibility for regulating 
insurance sold within their borders. Although the ACA will establish federal 
requirements that all health insurers will have to meet, some states have stricter limits 
that are not affected by the ACA and that insurers in those states will need to meet even 
after ACA is fully implemented. For example, although the ACA limits age rating to 3 to 
1, Massachusetts limits it to 2 to 1, and New York prohibits it altogether.121  
 
State-level exchanges also would provide opportunities for experimentation with 
a variety of models and for learning from them. For example, some states have been 
involved in forming and operating purchasing cooperatives (although, on the whole, that 
experience has not been positive, as noted above), while others run their public-employee 
health-benefit programs through an exchange. Another argument for state exchanges is 
that many health insurers, particularly HMOs, sell in state or local markets and would not 
expand if there were a national exchange. State exchanges also could adapt to the special 
circumstances of their state, for example, by ranking plans based on their handling of 
chronic diseases that are unusually prevalent in the area.122 And there is the widely held 
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belief that having control of social programs at the state or local level makes them more 
responsive to individuals’ concerns. 
 
Regional exchanges might offer some of the benefits both of national and state 
exchanges. Such regional entities could leave the states largely in control but give smaller 
states the options of sharing administrative costs, creating larger markets, and having 
access to bigger insurance pools. They could also address the question of how to offer 
insurance efficiently in metropolitan markets that span state lines. On the other hand, 
regional exchanges would present difficulties if markets or regulatory environments 
varied significantly from state to state within the region. They also would have to relate 
to more than one insurance department, which would undoubtedly cause political 
complications. Finally, risk adjustment in regional exchanges would be problematic. 
 
The ACA 
The ACA leaves implementation responsibility primarily with the states,123 though the 
HHS secretary will be responsible for issuing regulations to set standards for the 
operation of the exchanges.124 In addition, HHS will promulgate regulations for 
implementing the ACA insurance reforms, the provision of qualified health plans through 
the exchanges, the establishment of reinsurance and risk-adjustment mechanisms, and 
other regulatory requirements.125 States may elect to adopt, no later than January 1, 2014, 
these federal standards into their own laws or to adopt state standards that HHS finds to 
be equivalent.126 HHS also will provide grants to the states to assist with implementation, 
which will, it is hoped, be targeted to assure that states are proceeding seriously and 
complying fully with federal regulations and policies. 
 
The ACA provides two other opportunities that some states may want to explore 
in order to maximize their flexibility. For plan years beginning in 2017, states may apply 
to HHS for a waiver of up to five years from the requirement that they establish an 
exchange (as well as from other requirements of the legislation). A state may be granted 
such a waiver if HHS determines that the alternative state program offers benefit 
coverage that is as comprehensive, cost-sharing that is as affordable, and coverage of as 
many people as the reforms found in the ACA would accomplish; and if HHS also 
determines that the program achieves these objectives without increasing the federal 
deficit.127 In addition, the state must meet public-notice-and-comment and reporting 
requirements. Under a second option, states can, with HHS permission, create a “basic 
health plan” for people lacking affordable employer-sponsored coverage and who live in 
households under 200 percent of the poverty level. The state would receive a federal 
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payment of 95 percent of what would otherwise have been provided for premium tax 
credits and cost-sharing reduction payments.128  
 
The ACA also creates two possibilities for exchanges beyond the state level. First, 
with the approval of HHS, states may participate in regional exchanges.129 Second, if a 
state chooses not to establish an exchange or if HHS determines on or before January 1, 
2013, that the state has failed to take the actions necessary to implement the requirements 
imposed by the reform law, HHS must establish an exchange itself in that locale or 
contract with a nonprofit entity to do so.130 This exchange would simply be a federally 
operated state exchange, but it could also be a national exchange that would be available 
in all states lacking an ACA-compliant state equivalent.131  
 
In all likelihood, the ACA will result in a mix of state, regional, and national 
exchanges. 
 
Governance 
The Issue 
An exchange could be operated by a federal or state agency or by a private, probably 
nonprofit, entity. The latter could operate more flexibly, free from constraints such as 
state civil service and public-contracting requirements, open-records or open-meetings 
laws, and formal administrative-procedure requirements. In particular, a private or quasi-
governmental entity could pay higher salaries (which might be necessary to attract the 
best talent) than those currently possible under civil service laws. A private entity might 
also prove more acceptable to employers and insurance brokers,132 and it would be more 
insulated from the political infighting that often bedevils government.133 On the other 
hand, a public entity might, precisely because of these constraints, be more accountable 
and accessible.  
 
Exchanges will have to relate to a host of government agencies—state insurance 
commissioners and departments, the state consumer-protection or ombudsperson offices 
funded through the ACA, federal insurance regulators, state Medicaid agencies, 
government employee-benefit programs, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
and others. Regional exchanges will in addition need to work out their relationships with 
their constituent states, and subsidiary exchanges within a state will need to interact 
amongst themselves and with their state’s authorities. Political accountability will be 
particularly challenging for regional exchanges, which also may face difficult 
relationships with insurance regulators that have different regulatory policies for different 
states. An exchange could be folded into an existing state agency, such as the insurance 
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department, the state employee-benefits program, or the state Medicaid agency. But it 
will probably be advisable for exchanges to maintain their independence from state 
insurance regulators or Medicaid agencies while also maintaining good working 
relationships with them. 
 
The exchange governing board will have to comply with both the federal and state 
laws establishing the exchange. It will presumably be composed of experts and might 
well represent the users of the exchange or the interest groups affected by it (consumers, 
employers, labor organizations, and providers, for example). Strict conflict-of-interest 
requirements, however, must govern relationships with insurers, who should not be 
represented on the board. Exchanges may well find it advisable to contract out some 
administrative services to specialized firms rather than try to provide all services in-
house.134 Finally, it is important that states give the governing board substantial discretion 
to deal with the issues that arise over time in structuring the exchange and the health 
plans that it offers. 
 
The ACA 
The ACA says relatively little about exchange governance. It does say that exchanges are 
supposed to be governmental agencies or nonprofit entities established by a state,135 
which may elect to have separate or combined exchanges for individuals and small 
employers.136 A state also may contract with an “eligible entity” (a private organization 
that has relevant experience but is not an insurer, related to an insurer, or a state Medicaid 
agency) to carry out some exchange responsibilities.137 Exchanges are prohibited from 
using funds for certain purposes, such as staff retreats, promotional giveaways, excessive 
executive compensation, or lobbying,138 and they must consult with specified 
stakeholders in carrying out their business and also publish their charges on the 
Internet.139 ACA’s Section 1313 contains extensive reporting, auditing, and financial-
integrity requirements for exchanges, as well as penalties for serious misconduct. The 
U.S. Government Accounting Office is required to conduct a continuing study of the 
exchanges that reviews their operation and administration and makes recommendations 
for improvements. Payments made by, through, or in connection with an exchange are 
subject to the federal civil False Claims Act.140  
 
The ACA leaves unanswered, however, most of the important governance 
questions that one might want answered with respect to exchanges. These include how 
their governing boards are constituted and appointed; who can serve on the boards; 
whether state civil service law or contracting law applies; to what extent state 
administrative-procedure laws, judicial review, and open-meetings or open-records law 
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applies; and how exchanges relate to other state entities. HHS regulations may answer 
some of these still-open questions or simply leave the answers to the states.  
 
Relationships with Employers 
The Issue 
One of the purposes of exchanges is to provide greater choice of health plans to 
employees of small firms. If this goal is realized, and if exchanges offer higher-value and 
perhaps even lower-cost insurance, participation in exchanges may prove attractive to 
such employers. They could in turn provide the exchanges with the larger and healthier 
pool of enrollees that enable them to succeed.  
 
Exchanges will only work for small employers, however, if they offer 
convenience rather than administrative complexity. At least initially, exchanges will have 
to accept the higher costs of working closely with brokers, which small businesses rely 
on to advise them on insurance issues.141 Exchanges also will need to create a mechanism 
whereby a small employer can write a single check to the exchange for all of its 
employees.142 And to assure legal compliance, exchanges should conduct due diligence to 
check on the arrangements made for offering health plans to the small firm’s employees. 
Among the due-diligence points to be checked are that the policies comply with ERISA 
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (such as the latter’s prohibition against 
discriminating against older workers in premium contributions).  
 
Exchanges will need to be able to efficiently handle the frequent insurance “adds” 
and “drops” that are common among small businesses with high turnover rates. 
Exchanges could also collect and aggregate contributions from multiple employers of 
part-time employees or from employers of different family members. And exchanges 
should be able to assist employers in applying for and collecting the small-employer tax 
credit. In sum, employers should be able to cede to the exchange most of the health 
insurance functions that would otherwise be handled by a human resources department or 
an external consultant.  
 
The ACA 
The ACA sets out in some detail the size of the employers that may participate in the 
exchange but is less clear as to how exactly employer participation would work. A 
“SHOP exchange” is identified but not described in the legislation. It could possibly be 
intended as an exchange in which small employers themselves purchase group plans for 
their employees. This would seem to be consistent with section 1312(f)(2), which defines 
a qualified employer as an employer “that elects to make all full-time employees of such 
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employer eligible for 1 or more qualified health plans offered in the small group market 
through an Exchange.” 
 
Elsewhere, however, the ACA seems to countenance an arrangement under which 
small employers play a more passive role, simply contributing to the premiums used by 
their employees to purchase insurance as individuals. For example, the law states: “A 
qualified employer may provide support for coverage of employees under a qualified 
health plan by selecting any level of coverage under 1302(d) [bronze, silver, gold, or 
platinum] to be made available to employees through an Exchange.”143 The provision 
goes on to say that employees may choose any plan within the tier of coverage chosen by 
the employer.  
 
The ACA specifies that individuals may pay their premiums directly to the 
insurer,144 but it is not clear whether an employer may pay its own share of the premium 
to the exchange or must pay directly to the insurer. One thing that is clear under the ACA 
is that an employer may not set up a Section 125 (of the Internal Revenue Code) 
“cafeteria plan” that permits employees to purchase insurance through the exchange with 
their own earnings free of taxes.145 An employer can only allow employees to pay 
premiums through the exchange with a Section 125 plan if the employer itself contributes 
something to the cost of the insurance (although employers may continue to use Section 
125 plans to allow employees to pay for health insurance outside of the exchange).146 
 
There is no employer mandate, as such, in the ACA. Employers can be penalized 
if their employees receive premium or cost-sharing subsidies, however.147 Workers with 
health benefits through their job can obtain subsidies if their share of the premium for 
their employment-based policy exceeds 9.5 percent of their household income (or if the 
plan covers less than 60 percent of the total allowed costs of the plan’s benefits).148 To 
avoid a penalty, employers that cover their employees through an exchange will have to 
pay at least the cost of each individual’s policy in excess of 9.5 percent of the household 
income.  
 
The ACA prohibits health-status underwriting, but it permits age ratings up to a 3-
to-1 ratio, ratings based on tobacco use up to a 1.5-to-1 ratio, and “wellness” rewards that 
could reduce premiums by up to 30 percent—and, if the HHS secretary permits, up to 50 
percent.149 Premiums for individuals who purchase through the exchange will therefore 
vary considerably, and employer contributions might vary accordingly. Another law, the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, prohibits employers with 20 or more employees 
from requiring older employees to pay a higher percentage of premiums than younger 
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employees. Thus employers will still have to vary their premium contributions at least  
to respond to age differences so that the percentage of premium paid by employees  
stays constant.150  
 
It may well be that the task of making sure that the right premium is paid for each 
employee to each insurer can be handled by payroll-services firms. But if the exchange 
could offer employers a consolidated bill covering all employees, and itself take care of 
allocating the funds among insurers, this might make the exchange much more attractive 
to employers.  
 
Cost Control 
The Issue 
One of the hopes of advocates is that exchanges will help control the growth of health 
care spending and insurance costs. Continued growth of this kind, especially at rates in 
excess of the rate of growth of the economy, is not sustainable in the long run. Moreover, 
continued growth in the disparity between private-sector health-care-provider payment 
rates and public-sector (predominantly Medicare and Medicaid) payment rates is 
probably unsustainable as well. Either private-sector payments will need to be decreased, 
public payments increased, or public-sector beneficiaries forced to accept reduced access 
to providers (who will choose to forgo participation in public programs in favor of higher 
private-sector payments). But regardless of what happens to public-sector prices, private-
sector cost growth must be controlled.  
 
Health insurance exchanges are one of the few mechanisms in the ACA that 
address the growth of private-sector health care spending. The intention is that they will 
increase competition among insurers and focus it on price. The exchanges also may 
exclude insurers that charge excessive premiums; it is hoped that insurers struggling to 
lower premiums will in turn drive harder bargains with providers, pressuring them to 
lower their prices and control utilization. Insurers also may adopt different strategies for 
paying providers, which might result in better coordination or even reduced utilization  
of care.151 
 
For this approach to in fact reduce prices, however, several of the elements of a 
successful exchange, each of which has been described above, must work together: 
 
• Adverse selection will have to be effectively curtailed. 
• Exchanges will need to reduce administrative and premium costs.  
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• The exchange market must be large enough to attract multiple insurers. 
• Exchanges must be attractive to employers. 
• Qualified individuals and employees must have incentives to choose lower-cost 
plans, thereby driving competition. This objective could be realized by 
benchmarking premium subsidies and employer contributions to lower-cost plans, 
and by requiring enrollees to cover the cost of more expensive plans on their 
own.152 
• Ultimately, the price and utilization of health care goods and services must  
be reduced.153 
 
The ACA 
The provisions of the statute relating to a number of the elements of an effective cost-
control program—including provisions relating to adverse selection, reducing 
administrative costs, relations with providers, and number of participants—have already 
been described in this report. 
 
The ACA requires that premium subsidies be geared to the difference in cost 
between the percentage of gross adjusted household income that applies to the enrollee’s 
income bracket and the cost of the second-lowest-cost silver plan in the exchange.154 This 
requirement will create an incentive for individuals and families in the nongroup market 
to attend carefully to plan price when choosing a plan. Meanwhile, employers are not 
required by the ACA to limit their contributions. The excise tax on high-cost health plans, 
however, will probably drive down employer contributions over time, and the exchange 
structure may encourage employers to pay a more uniform and perhaps lower share  
of premiums. 
 
Finally, section 1311(g) of the ACA encourages exchange plans to create market 
incentives for quality improvement. If these plans are required to spend significant 
resources on quality initiatives not required of non-exchange plans, this could make 
exchange plans less competitive. On the other hand, if quality-improvement strategies 
also coordinate care and reduce the use of unnecessary care, cost reductions could result, 
making exchange plans more attractive. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This report’s main findings are as follows: 
 
• It is absolutely necessary that exchanges be protected against adverse selection. 
Provisions of the ACA should help, but if small-group and nongroup insurance 
plans are available outside the exchange, the possibility of adverse selection 
remains open.  
• For a number of reasons—including greater market power, economies of scale, 
more stable risk pools, and stronger protection against adverse selection—
exchanges function better with larger numbers of enrollees and a higher 
percentage of consumers participating in insurance markets through exchanges. 
• The advantages and disadvantages of combining small-group and nongroup risk 
pools and exchanges, and of creating regional or subsidiary exchanges, must be 
carefully weighed. 
• The exchange model created by the ACA offers consumers structured choices. An 
important implementation decision will be whether to further structure choices or, 
alternatively, to offer greater flexibility. 
• The ACA contains many provisions designed to maximize transparency and 
disclosure. Operationalizing these requirements will be one of the most important 
tasks of implementing the ACA. 
• The exchanges must increase competition among insurers and focus that 
competition on value and price. 
• If they are to offer better value to enrollees, exchanges must find ways to reduce 
administrative costs to employers and insurers. 
• The ACA delegates a number of regulatory responsibilities to exchanges, which 
must certify plans for exchange participation. An important implementation 
choice will be whether exchanges should, on the one hand, maximize plan 
participation by minimizing certification requirements; or, on the other hand, use 
their certification authority to limit exchange participation to high-value plans. 
• The exchanges play important roles as advocates of insurance affordability, as 
administrators of cost-sharing reduction subsidies, and as gateways to other  
public programs. 
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• Although the ACA opts for creating state exchanges, it establishes federal 
fallback authority to create a federal exchange as well as a multistate insurance 
program. It also leaves open the possibility of regional exchanges.  
• The ACA provides very little guidance on exchanges’ governance. Important 
choices will need to be made as to how the entities that govern exchanges should 
be structured and how they should relate to other state and federal institutions. 
• Exchanges must be employer-friendly if they are to succeed. Thus, while the 
ACA offers little guidance to exchanges on how to interact with employers, this 
relationship must be a major focus of implementation efforts. 
• The exchange has been sold as a mechanism for moderating the growth of health 
insurance costs. Achieving this goal will be possible only if exchanges are 
implemented so as to maximize competition, choice, and participation and to 
minimize administrative cost and adverse selection. 
 
In a second report, now being prepared, we will further analyze solutions to the 
problems that have stymied exchange efforts in the past and specific recommendations 
will be offered.  
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